Verifying space and time requirements for resource-bounded agents

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Abstract

The *effective reasoning capability* of an agent can be defined as its capability to infer, within a given space and time bound, facts that are logical consequences of its knowledge base. In this paper we show how to determine the effective reasoning capability of an agent with limited memory by encoding the agent's reasoning system as a finite state machine (FSM) Ψ and verifying the existence of a program (sequence of inference steps) that, starting from a given knowledge base K, leads Ψ to a state satisfying a given formula ϕ. Our approach is general enough to admit verification of any reasoning agent whose inference rules can be encoded as transitions between FSM states. As an illustration, we show how to encode two example reasoners: a classical propositional reasoner which can derive all classical consequences of its knowledge base given unlimited memory, and a forward-chaining rule-based reasoner of the kind found in many applications employing ontological reasoning and business rules. We then go on to show how the transition system can be used to automatically verify the existence of a derivation, and present experimental results using the Model Based Planner (MBP) which illustrates how the length of the deduction varies for different memory sizes.

1 Introduction

Consider an agent that has a finite knowledge base and some rules of inference which allow it to derive new information from its knowledge base. It is intuitively

clear that some derivations require more memory than others (e.g., to store intermediate results), and that two agents with the same knowledge base and the same set of inference rules, but with different amounts of memory, may not be able to derive the same formulas.

The question of how much memory a reasoning agent needs to derive a formula is of considerable theoretical and practical interest. From a theoretical point of view, it is interesting to investigate how the deductive strength of a particular logic changes when only a fixed number of formulas are allowed to be 'active' in a derivation. This is different from the question of bounds on the size proofs [13], since we assume that the whole proof does not need to be held in memory (some intermediate steps may be overwritten).

From a practical point of view, the question of whether an agent will run out of memory or time before achieving its goal(s) is clearly a major concern for the agent developer. As agent tasks become more open ended, the amount of memory required to achieve them becomes harder to predict a priori. For example, the reasoning capabilities of agents assumed by many web service applications is non trivial (e.g., reasoning over complex ontologies or about business processes described by a set of business rules) and the memory requirements correspondingly difficult for the agent developer to determine a priori. At the same time trends towards mobile agents and agents which run on mobile devices such as PDAs and smart phones imply more processor and memory efficient agent designs (e.g., the Micro-FIPA-OS [19] and JADE-LEAP [4] platforms). Such devices typically have a relatively small amount of physical memory (and no virtual memory), which must be shared between the OS, the agent platform and other applications running on the device. While increased bandwidth and more powerful handheld devices will undoubtedly become available, the rapid growth in, e.g., the number and complexity of ontologies, seems likely to outstrip any increases in hardware capabilities, at least for the foreseeable future.

In this paper, we present a novel procedure for automatically verifying the space and time requirements for resource-bounded reasoning agents. Specifically, we address the question: given an agent and a formula ϕ, does the agent have sufficient memory to derive ϕ, and, if it does, what is the length of the shortest derivation within the specified memory bound? In outline, our approach is as follows. We represent a reasoning agent as a finite state machine in which the states correspond the formulas currently held in the reasoner's memory and the transitions between states correspond to applying the reasoning rules. Our approach is general enough to admit verification of reasoners with any set of inference rules, provided that those rules can be encoded as transitions between FSM states. To illustrate the generality of our approach, we show how to encode two example reasoners: a classical propositional reasoner which can derive all classical consequences of its

knowledge base given unlimited memory, and a forward-chaining rule-based agent of the kind found in many applications employing ontological reasoning and business rules. To check whether a reasoner has enough memory to derive a formula ϕ, we specify the FSM as input to the model-based planner MBP [6], and check whether the reasoner has a plan (a choice of memory allocations and inference rule applications), all executions of which lead to states containing ϕ. Using a simple business rules example, we show how MBP can be used to automatically verify the existence of a derivation, and present experimental results which illustrate how the length of the deduction varies for different memory sizes.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we introduce our model of the agent's memory and give some examples of the kinds of properties we wish to verify. In section 3, we describe our formal model of a resource bounded agent and show how to model two example agents, a simple agent that reasons using rules, and a classical reasoner capable of deriving any classical consequence of its knowledge base. In section 4 we briefly introduce the MBP model-based planner and explain how it is used to verify the memory requirements of a resource-bounded reasoner. In section 5 we present a simple example to illustrate the effects of memory limitations on a rule-based reasoning agent and present results from MBP illustrating how the length of deduction varies for different memory sizes. In section 6 we briefly describe related work before concluding in section 7.

2 Memory bounds

Consider an agent running on a small device like a mobile phone, a simple PDA, or even a smaller device like a node of a sensor network. The agent has a pool of potentially available information stored in a Knowledge Base (K)[1] and a fixed set of reasoning rules. Using information from the knowledge base and the inference rules, the agent can infer new formulas. We assume that the knowledge base is too large to fit into agent's memory, and the agent can store at most n formulas from K in memory at any given time. Loading new information from the KB when the agent's memory is full overwrites some of the information currently in memory. For example, a location-aware device which advises a traveller about local amenities and tourist attractions cannot load an entire database of attractions and ontological definitions in memory when computing a recommendation, and will have to manage the subset of formulas from K which are in memory and available for inference. Given this resource bound, which we call, 'memory of size

[1]The information could be stored in a remote database or in a persistent memory like a flash card or obtained in input from a user. In this paper we abstract from these aspects and say only that information is potentially available in a knowledge base K.

n', the properties we are interested in verifying are of the form: can a formula ϕ be derived with a memory of size n?; what is the minimum amount of memory required to derive ϕ?; is there a relation between memory size and the number of steps required to derive ϕ? what is the minimum amount of memory required to derive ϕ with the shortest derivation?

To illustrate the impact of memory bounds in the reasoning process, consider an agent with a knowledge base K composed of the following formulas:

$$A, A \to B, B \to C, C \to D. \tag{1}$$

If the only inference rule the agent uses is modus ponens, it will require a memory of at least size 2 to derive D:

1. read A (memory contains $\{A\}$)

2. read $A \to B$ (memory contains $\{A,\ A \to B\}$)

3. apply modus ponens and store B, overwrite A
(memory contains $\{A \to B,\ B\}$)

4. read $B \to C$, overwrite $A \to B$
(memory contains $\{B,\ B \to C\}$)

... ...

n. until we apply all the rules and conclude D.

The deduction above requires only two formulas in memory at any given time as we can overwrite the antecedent of an implication with the result of applying modus ponens, load the next implication, apply modus ponens, and store the new result. Notice that after adding new implications, say $E \to F$, $F \to G$, we still need only two formulas in memory to derive G. Thus memory requirements do not necessarily depend upon the number of formulas used in the derivation. However, if K contains the following formulas

$$A, A \to B, A \wedge B \to C, B \wedge C \to D \tag{2}$$

and the agent reasons using the inference rules modus ponens (MP) and conjunction introduction ($\wedge_I$), then the derivation requires storing at least 3 formulas in memory at any given time (see Figure 1). Notice that the two knowledge bases (1) and (2) are logically equivalent. Thus memory requirements can change for logically equivalent knowledge bases, and knowledge bases can be engineered to optimise memory requirements for the derivation of given facts. Also, it can be

shown that adding conjunction elimination to the set of rules allows the agent to derive D with only 2 formulas in memory (we omit the proof for lack of space). Thus, memory requirements also depend upon the inference rules available to the agent.

	Action	Memory content
1	read$(A \to B)$	$\{A \to B\}$
2	read(A)	$\{A \to B, A\}$
3	MP	$\{B, A\}$
5	$\wedge_I$	$\{B, A \wedge B\}$
6	read$(A \wedge B \to C)$	$\{B, A \wedge B, A \wedge B \to C\}$
7	MP	$\{B, C, A \wedge B \to C\}$
8	$\wedge_I$	$\{B, B \wedge C, A \wedge B \to C\}$
9	read$(B \wedge C \to D)$	$\{B, B \wedge C, B \wedge C \to D\}$
10	MP	$\{B, B \wedge C, D\}$

Figure 1: A proof of D with 3 formulas in memory

In summary, there is a trade-off between space and time requirements, and the memory required for a derivation will depend on both K and the agent's inference rules. Given a procedure for determining how much memory a given derivation requires (and how much time it takes) for particular inference rules and K, an agent developer can ensure that an agent has sufficient memory for a particular task, or, conversely engineer a K which will allow an agent with particular inference capabilities and memory size to derive a given formula.

3 Formal model

We model resource-bounded agents as finite state machines (FSM) or transition systems. Let the internal language of the agent be some language L (e.g. propositional language). The definition of a transition system is given relative to the following components:

1. the bound n on the agent's memory size
2. the agent's reasoning rules
3. the agent's knowledge base $K \subseteq L$
4. the agent's goal formula $A_G \in L$

The set of all subformulas of K and A_G will be denoted by Ω. We abstract away from the size of the formulas. However, given K, the maximal size of any formula which the agent's state has information about, will be fixed.

In the remainder of this section, we first define the language and transition systems for 'definite reasoning' agents, which never do reasoning by cases or assumption-based reasoning, and give an example of such an agent (rule-based agent). We then introduce a more complex logic for agents that need to maintain a set of epistemic alternatives, and give an example of such an agent (classical reasoner).

3.1 Definite reasoners

The language of the logic BML^d (for bounded memory logic, definite case) is defined relative to the agent's internal language L. Well formed formulas (w.f.f.) are defined as follows:

- If A is a formula of L, then $\mathrm{B}\,A$ (the agent believes A) is a w.f.f.
- If ϕ is a w.f.f., then $\neg\phi$, $\mathrm{EX}\,\phi$ ('in one of the successor states, ϕ') and $\mathrm{EF}\,\phi$ ('in some future state, ϕ') are w.f.f.
- If ϕ_1 and ϕ_2 are w.f.f., then $\phi_1 \wedge \phi_2$ is a w.f.f.

Other boolean connectives are defined in the usual way. We also define $\mathrm{AX}\,\phi$ as $\neg\mathrm{EX}\,\neg\phi$ and $\mathrm{AG}\,\phi$ as $\neg\mathrm{EF}\,\neg\phi$.

A transition system $M = (S, R, V)$ consists of a set of states S, a serial binary relation R on S (transitions between states) and an assignment $V : S \longrightarrow \mathcal{P}(\Omega)$ (assigning to the state the set of formulas the agent believes in that state). Notice that $V(s)$ is not a classical truth assignment, as it might contain complex formulas, e.g., $A \wedge B$, as well as contradictory formulas, e.g., $A \wedge B, \neg B \in V(s)$. To reflect the fact that the agents have bounded memory, we postulate that V can assign at most n formulas to any given state. The transitions which the agent can make depend on the agent's inference rules. In our model, we assume that one of the agent's possible transitions is 'reading' a K formula into its memory or 'active state'. Reading a formula may correspond to reading from flash memory, asking for user input, or reading data from the server over the network.

The definition of a formula being satisfied in $M, s \in S$ is as follows:

$M, s \models \mathrm{B}\,A$ iff $A \in V(s)$

$M, s \models \neg\phi$ iff $M, s \not\models \phi$

$M, s \models \phi \wedge \psi$ iff $M, s \models \phi$ and $M, s \models \psi$

$M, s \models \mathrm{EX}\,\phi$ iff there exists a state t such that $R(s,t)$ and $M, t \models \phi$.

$M, s \models \mathrm{EF}\,\phi$ iff there exists a sequence of states $t_1, \ldots, t_k$ such that for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, k-1\}$, $R(t_i, t_{i+1})$, $t_1 = s$ and $M, t_k \models \phi$

Let **M** be a class of models (for example, all models with the same knowledge base and the same transition rules). A formula is **M**-satisfiable if it is true in some state in some model in **M**. A formula is **M**-valid if it is true in every state in every model in **M**. The definition of logical consequence is standard.

The standard propositional and modal axioms for EX and EF are valid in all models. The bound n on the size of the agent's memory is expressed by the following axiom:

B(n) $\mathrm{B}\,A_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge \mathrm{B}\,A_n \rightarrow \neg \mathrm{B}\,A_{n+1}$ where $A_i \neq A_j$ for $i, j \in \{1, \ldots, n+1\}$, $i \neq j$.

We can express that the agent can derive its goal A_G from its knowledge base K as $\mathrm{EF}\,\mathrm{B}\,A_G$ (there is some future state where the agent believes A_G). The fact that a formula is derivable in at least k steps can be expressed as $\mathrm{EX}^k \mathrm{B}\,A_G$ (where EX^k denotes k applications of the operator EX). Similarly, the fact that an agent needs at least k steps to derive a formula A_G can be expressed as $\mathrm{AX}^k \neg \mathrm{B}\,A_G$.

3.2 Rule-based reasoners

In this section we present a simple example of an agent which reasons using rules, e.g., ontology rules, or business rules. We assume that agent's knowledge base consists of ground atomic formulas and rules of the form $A_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge A_n \rightarrow B$, where $A_1, \ldots, A_n, B$ are atomic formulas (see, for example, [14]). An example of such rule would be

$$Parent(x, y) \wedge Brother(y, z) \rightarrow Uncle(x, z)$$

Essentially, such agents can only reason by a single inference rule:

$$\frac{A_1(\bar{a}), \ldots, A_n(\bar{a}) \quad \forall \bar{x}(A_1(\bar{x}) \wedge \ldots \wedge A_n(\bar{x}) \rightarrow B(\bar{x}))}{B(\bar{a})}$$

By generating all possible substitutions of constants occurring in the knowledge base into the rule, we can reduce the knowledge base to a purely propositional set of formulas, consisting of propositional variables and implications of the form $p_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge p_n \rightarrow q$. Then the only rules the agent needs to derive all 'rule-based' consequences are conjunction introduction $\wedge_I$ and modus ponens MP:

$$\frac{A_1,\ A_2}{A_1 \wedge A_2}\wedge_I \qquad \frac{A_1,\ A_1 \rightarrow A_2}{A_2} MP$$

We show how to represent this reasoner as an FSM. The rule-based reasoner has the following transitions:

Read $R(s,t)$ if $V(t) = V(s)' \cup \{A\}$ for some $A \in K$.

AND $R(s,t)$ if $A_1, A_2 \in V(s)$ and $V(t) = V(s)' \cup \{A_1 \wedge A_2\}$.

MP $R(s,t)$ if $A_1 \in V(s)$, $A_1 \rightarrow A_2 \in V(s)$, and $V(t) = V(s)' \cup \{A_2\}$.

where $V(s)' = V(s)$ if $|V(s)| < n$, else $V(s)' = V(s) \setminus \{A\}$ for some formula $A \in V(s)$. Notice that this definition of $V'(s)$ guarantees that after each transition $R(s,t)$, the memory bound is satisfied by $V(t)$, i.e., $|V(t)| \leq n$. We also assume that if no rules are applicable, then the agent goes into a special terminating state with a transition to itself.

It can be shown that A_G is derivable from K using only modus ponens and conjunction introduction with memory of size n if, and only if, $M_{K,A_G}, start \models \mathrm{EF}\,\mathrm{B}\,A_G$, where M_{K,A_G} is a rule-based transition model where states are assigned only formulas which are subformulas of K and A_G, $V(s)$ for any s contains at most n formulas, and $V(start) = \emptyset$.

The logical axioms corresponding to the rule-based reasoner's transition rules are as follows (we assume $n \geq 1$ for **A1**):

A1 $\mathrm{EX}\,\mathrm{B}\,A$ for $A \in K$

A2 $\mathrm{B}\,A_1 \wedge \mathrm{B}\,A_2 \rightarrow \mathrm{EX}\,\mathrm{B}\,(A_1 \wedge A_2)$

A3 $\mathrm{B}\,A_1 \wedge \mathrm{B}\,(A_1 \rightarrow A_2) \rightarrow \mathrm{EX}\,\mathrm{B}\,A_2$

Finally, we need to express that only transitions which are made according to the rules are possible, and that in each transition at most one new formula is added and at most one formula is overwritten.

A4 $\mathrm{EX}\,(\mathrm{B}\,A_1 \wedge \mathrm{B}\,A_2) \rightarrow \mathrm{B}\,A_1 \vee \mathrm{B}\,A_2$

A5 $\mathrm{EX}\,(\neg\mathrm{B}\,A_1 \wedge \neg\mathrm{B}\,A_2) \rightarrow \neg\mathrm{B}\,A_1 \vee \neg\mathrm{B}\,A_2$

A6 $\mathrm{EX}\,\mathrm{B}\,(A_1 \wedge A_2) \rightarrow \mathrm{B}\,(A_1 \wedge A_2) \vee (\mathrm{B}\,A_1 \wedge \mathrm{B}\,A_2)$

A7 $\mathrm{EX}\,\mathrm{B}\,A_2 \rightarrow \mathrm{B}\,A_2 \vee \bigvee_{A_1 \rightarrow A_2 \in K}(\mathrm{B}\,(A_1 \rightarrow A_2) \wedge \mathrm{B}\,A_1)$ for $A_2 \notin K$ and $A_2 \neq B \wedge C$

Let $\mathbf{M}(K,n)$ stand for the class of models where the knowledge base is K, the memory size is n, and the only possible transitions are defined by the transition rules above and, in addition, for some states s, $R(s,s)$. We then have the following completeness result:

Theorem 1 *The logic defined by the set of axiom schemata* **A1 - A7, B(n)**, *together with the classical and modal validities for* EX *and* EF *, is strongly sound and complete with respect to* $\mathbf{M}(K)$.

In other words, **A1–A7, B(n)** axiomatise the class of transition systems where in addition to the valid transitions, trivial transitions not adding any formulas are also possible (we also do not deal here with the terminating state etc.). To force each transition to be non-trivial, we need extra axioms, which we omit here as they are rather cumbersome and require additional syntactic restrictions.

3.3 More general reasoners

In this section, we model reasoners which can reason by cases, or in general consider hypothetical states; this means that their transitions do not necessarily follow the logical consequence relation. We also extend the language to express disbelief as well as belief.

Consider a reasoner who believes:

$$A \vee B, A \rightarrow C, B \rightarrow C.$$

To derive C, it has to reason by cases: assume A; derive C. Then, assume B; derive C. Hence, it is safe to believe C. However, if the process of assuming A corresponds to a transition to a state where A is believed, the modelling is not 'safe' — the agent's beliefs are not justified by valid inference steps. In the state where it assumes A, the agent should remember that this is just one of the epistemic alternatives, and that in others A is false and B is true.

To deal with such reasoners, we add an extra set of 'epistemic alternatives' or possible worlds to each state. Intuitively, a formula is now believed in a state if it is true in all of the epistemic alternatives associated with this state. We express this as $\Box\mathrm{B}\, A$.

The language of the logic BML (for bounded memory logic) extends the language of BML^d by adding extra clauses:

- If A is a formula of L, then $\bar{\mathrm{B}}\, A$ (the agent disbelieves A) is a w.f.f.
- If ϕ is a w.f.f., then $\Diamond\phi$ is a w.f.f.

We also define $\Box\phi$ as $\neg\Diamond\neg\phi$.

For such general reasoners, we can express that the agent can derive A_G from its knowledge base K as $\mathrm{EF}\,\Box\mathrm{B}\, A_G$ (there is some future state where in all epistemic alternatives the agent believes A_G).

A BML transition system $M = (S, W, R, U, T, F)$ consists of a set of states S, a set of possible worlds or epistemic alternatives W, a binary relation R on S,

a function assigning to each state a set of epistemic alternatives $U : S \longrightarrow \mathcal{P}(W)$, and two assignments $T : W \longrightarrow \mathcal{P}(\Omega)$ and $F : W \longrightarrow \mathcal{P}(\Omega)$ which say whether the value of an (internal language) formula in a world is true or false (where, as before Ω is the set of subformulas of K and A_G). As before, to reflect the bound on the agent's memory, we require $|T(w)| + |F(w)| \leq n$, for any given state w. Moreover, the truth assignments should be consistent, i.e., $T(w) \cap F(w) = \emptyset$. The following truth definitions have been added or modified compared to BML^d. Note that we talk about truth in a world and truth in a state:

$M, w \models \mathrm{B}\, A$ iff $A \in T(w)$

$M, w \models \bar{\mathrm{B}}\, A$ iff $A \in F(w)$

$M, s \models \Diamond\phi$ iff there exists w in $U(s)$, such that $M, w \models \phi$.

The bound n on the size of the agent's memory is expressed by the following axiom (which replaces **B(n)** defined for BML^d):

B(n) $\Box(\widetilde{\mathrm{B}}\ A_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge \widetilde{\mathrm{B}}\ A_n \rightarrow \neg\, \widetilde{\mathrm{B}}\ A_{n+1})$, where $\widetilde{\mathrm{B}}\ A_i$ stands for either $\mathrm{B}\, A_i$ or $\bar{\mathrm{B}}\, A_i$ and $A_i \neq A_j$ for $i, j \in \{1, \ldots, n+1\}$, $i \neq j$.

3.4 Classical reasoners

In this section we present a simple example of a classical reasoner, which, given unlimited memory, is capable of deriving any classical consequence of its knowledge base.

Epistemic alternatives are introduced when the classical reasoner is applying non-deterministic rules, such as elimination of disjunction. Suppose, for example, that the agent has $A \vee B$ in its knowledge base and starts in a state s_0, which has a single epistemic alternative w_0 with $T(w_0) = F(w_0) = \emptyset$. The agent can read $A \vee B$ and transit to a state s_1 with a single epistemic alternative w_1, such that $A \vee B \in T(w_1)$. Now the agent applies a non-deterministic rule for disjunction; it may assume that both disjuncts are true, or A is true and B is false, or vice versa. Formally, this means that the agent transits to a state s_2 where the epistemic alternatives are:

1. w_{11} with $A, B \in T(w_{11})$,
2. w_{12} with $A \in T(w_{12})$ and $B \in F(w_{12})$,
3. w_{13} with $B \in T(w_{12})$ and $A \in F(w_{12})$.

Note that the classical reasoner cannot derive A from $A \vee B$ in the sense of our criterion of $\mathrm{EF}\,\Box\mathrm{B}\,A$ being true: A is true in w_{11} and w_{12}, but false in w_{13}, so s_2 does not satisfy $\Box\mathrm{B}\,A$.

The transition relation R between states is defined in terms of expansion relation between epistemic alternatives $\preceq$. Expansion corresponds to applying an inference rule to formulas in the epistemic alternative; in the example above, w_1 is expanded (by applying the rule of disjunction elimination) to w_{11}, w_{12}, w_{13}. Formally, $R(s,t)$ holds if $U(s) = \{w_1, \ldots, w_m\}$, and for some $w_i \in U(s)$, $U(t) = (U(s) \backslash \{w_1\}) \cup \{v : w_1 \preceq v\}$.

Before we define the expansion relation, we need a few preliminary definitions and comments. Note that the classical reasoner agent can construct new formulas in addition to decomposing formulas. We only allow the construction of formulas which are in Ω (the set of subformulas of K and A_G). This does not affect the completeness of agent's rules (since these are the only formulas it may possibly need in the derivation of A_G from K), but allows us to represent it as a finite state machine.

Since the agent can both believe and disbelieve formulas (and its language contains negation), an issue of inconsistent possible worlds arises. An agent *cannot* make a transition to a possible world where the same formula is assigned to true and false. All rules therefore have to have a proviso that if $w \preceq v$ then it impossible, for any formula A, to have $A \in T(w)$ and $A \in F(v)$ or vice versa:

Recall $w \preceq v$ and $A \in T(v) \Rightarrow A \notin F(w)$ and $w \preceq v$ and $A \in F(v) \Rightarrow A \notin T(w)$

An analogue of the earlier definition of $V'(s)$ (essentially, the assignment which persists in the next state) is reformulated as follows (to account for rules which introduce two formulas):

$\mathbf{T^1}, \mathbf{F^1}$: If $|T(w) \cup F(w)| \leq n-1$, then $T^1(w) = T(w)$ and $F^1(w) = F(w)$. Otherwise, either
$T^1(w) = T(w) \backslash \{A\}$ for some $A \in T(w)$, and $F^1(w) = F(w)$, or
$F^1(w) = F(w) \backslash \{A\}$ for some $A \in F(w)$, and $T^1(w) = T(w)$.

$\mathbf{T^2}, \mathbf{F^2}$: If $|T(w) \cup F(w)| \leq n-2$, then $T^2(w) = T(w)$ and $F^2(w) = F(w)$. Otherwise, either
$T^2(w) = T(w) \backslash \{A_1, A_2\}$ for some distinct $A_1, A_2 \in T(w)$, and $F^2(w) = F(w)$, or
$T^2(w) = T(w) \backslash \{A_1\}$ and $F^2(w) = F(w) \backslash \{A_2\}$, or
$T^2(w) = T(w)$ and $F^2(w) = F(w) \backslash \{A_1, A_2\}$

Finally, here are the expansion rules:

Read $w \preceq v$ if $A \in K$, $F(v) = F^1(w)$ and $T(w) = T^1(w) \cup \{A\}$, and **Recall** is satisfied ($A \notin F(w)$).

Split $w \preceq v_1$ and $w \preceq v_2$ if for some formula $A \in \Omega$ with $A \notin T(w) \cup F(w)$, $T(v_1) = T^1(w) \cup \{A\}$ and $F(v_1) = F^1(w)$, and $F(v_2) = F^1(w) \cup \{A\}$ and $T(v_2) = T^1(w)$, and **Recall** is satisfied. This transition rule enables the agent to do reasoning by cases, and is equivalent to having $A \vee \neg A$ as an axiom, for every $A \in \Omega$.

ExContradictio $w \preceq v$ if for some A, $A \in T(w)$ and $\neg A \in T(w)$, or $A \in F(w)$ and $\neg A \in F(w)$, and $T(v)$ contains A_G.

makeNot $w \preceq v$ if for some $\neg A \in \Omega$, either $A \in T(w)$, $T(v) = T^1(w)$, and $F(v) = F^1(w) \cup \{\neg A\}$, or $A \in F(w)$, $F(v) = F^1(w)$, and $T(v) = T^1(w) \cup \{\neg A\}$, and **Recall** is satisfied.

elimNot $w \preceq v$ if for some $\neg A \in \Omega$, either $\neg A \in T(w)$, $T(v) = T^1(w)$, and $F(v) = F^1(w) \cup \{A\}$, or $\neg A \in F(w)$, $F(v) = F^1(w)$, and $T(v) = T^1(w) \cup \{A\}$, and **Recall** is satisfied.

makeAnd $w \preceq v$ if for some $A_1 \wedge A_2 \in \Omega$, $A_1, A_2 \in T(w) \cup F(w)$ and either $A_1, A_2 \in T(w)$, in which case $F(v) = F^1(w)$ and $T(v) = T^1(w) \cup \{A_1 \wedge A_2\}$, or else $T(v) = T^1(w)$ and $F(v) = F^1(w) \cup \{A_1 \wedge A_2\}$, and **Recall** is satisfied. In other words, the agent can make a conjunction of two formulas if this conjunction is in Ω, and the values of both conjuncts are defined.

elimAnd $w \preceq v$ if $A_1 \wedge A_2 \in T(w) \cup F(w)$, and either $A_1, A_2 \in T(v)$, in which case $F(v) = F^2(w)$ and $T(v) = T^2(w) \cup \{A_1, A_2\}$, or $F(v) = F^2(w) \cup \{A_1\}$ and $T(v) = T^2(w) \cup \{A_2\}$, or $F(v) = F^2(w) \cup \{A_2\}$ and $T(v) = T^2(w) \cup \{A_1\}$, or $F(v) = F^2(w) \cup \{A_1, A_2\}$ and $T(v) = T^2(w)$ and **Recall** is satisfied.

Inference rules for other connectives are defined in similar fashion.

Theorem 2 (Completeness with infinite memory) *A classical reasoner with unbounded memory can derive A_G from K whenever A_G is a classical consequence of K.*

Proof: Let A_G be a classical consequence of K.

If K is inconsistent, we use **ExContradictio** to derive A_G.

If K is consistent, the strategy for deriving A_G is as follows. The reasoner does not overwrite any formulas. It reads all formulas from K and decomposes them down to all possible assignments to propositional variables in K. If variables of A_G are a subset of the variables of K, then each branch in the previous execution can be continued with a successful composition of A_G (since every assignment satisfying K satisfies A_G. Else let $Var(A_G) \backslash Var(K) = \{q_1, \ldots, q_m\}$. Then, continue each branch of the previous derivation with m splits on each of q_i. This will generate all possible assignments to $Var(K) \cup \{q_1, \ldots, q_m\}$ which make K true. By assumption, each of them makes A_G true, so again on each branch A_G can be successfully assembled. ‖

4 Verifying reasoning capabilities

The problem of identifying the existence (and the minimal length) of a deduction for A_G from a knowledge base K, for an agent with bounded memory modelled as a transition system M can be recast as a *planning problem*: find a control strategy for M (a plan) such that, starting from any state in K, it leads T to some state in A_G. The plan is indeed the proof of A_G.

In general, M is a *nondeterministic* transition system, since applying a rule may lead to several epistemic alternatives, as shown e.g. in Sec. 3.4 for the case of disjunction elimination. Thus, we are interested in *strong* plans [6]: tree-structured plans such that their execution leads to the goal, for *every* possible outcome of the actions in the plan.

Among the few planners capable to deal with strong planning for nondeterministic domains, we selected MBP, a system coupling effective algorithms with an input language which allows a concise description of transition systems in logical terms. In this section, we provide a high-level description of the way the proof existence problem is recast as a planning domain in MBP. We take as reference the classical reasoner, leaving the simpler case of rule-based reasoning to the reader. For reasons of space, we will omit the encodings of the rules associated to disjunction and implication, which are analogous to the one for conjunction.

In the following, we partition Ω into the subsets Ω_0, $\Omega_\neg$, $\Omega_\vee$, $\Omega_\wedge$, $\Omega_\rightarrow$ which contain respectively atomic formulae, and formulae whose top-level connective is a negation, disjunction, conjunction or implication. Moreover we define the functions $l(\cdot)$ and $r(\cdot)$ which return the left/right parts of non-atomic formulas. We omit their trivial definition, and we take the convention that $l(\neg\phi) = \phi$.

The core of the encoding consists in representing the state transition system described in Section 3 as a planning domain. Formally, a planning domain is a

triple (S, Act, R), where S are the states of the domain, Act is a set of actions, and $R \subseteq S \times Act \times S$ is the transition relation, describing the outcomes of the action execution; an action is executable over a state s iff $\exists(s, \alpha, s') \in R$.

Our mapping views actions as deduction rules and domain states as epistemic states of the agent.

In a planning domain, the state is represented by means of a set of *state variables*. In our case, the set V will be composed of $|\Omega|$ three-valued state variables. We will denote with $V(\phi)$ the value of the variable associated to ϕ. $V(\phi)$ corresponds to the believed value of ϕ ($\top$ or $\bot$), or indicates that nothing is believed about it (U), representing the T, F assignments of the transition system for BML. The memory bound condition is enforced by a constraint $\Psi_{\leq n}$ on R, of the form $|\{A : V(A) \neq U\}| \leq n$, directly represented in MBP as a $TRANS\ \Psi_{\leq n}$ construct.

The actions of the domain represent every possible instance of the deduction rules (Read,Split,etc.) over the formulas in Ω. Such instantiation must also explicitly consider, for a given action, every possible choice of the formula(s) to be overwritten by the newly produced formula(s). As such, actions feature one argument in Ω representing the formula to be read, split, or composed, and one or two additional arguments in $\Omega' = \Omega \cup \{A_0\}$, indicating the formula(s) to be overwritten, and the fictitious formula A_0 if no rewriting occurs. This defines the range of the action variable α in the planning domain:

$$\alpha \in \bigcup_{\substack{A\in K\\ B\in\Omega'}} \mathbf{Read}(A,B) \cup \bigcup_{\substack{A\in \Omega\\ B\in\Omega'}} \mathbf{Split}(A,B) \cup \bigcup_{\substack{A\in \Omega\\ B\in\Omega'}} \mathbf{ExC}(A,B)$$
$$\cup \bigcup_{\substack{A\in \Omega_\neg\\ B\in\Omega'}} \mathbf{makeNot}(A,B) \cup \bigcup_{\substack{A\in \Omega_\neg\\ B\in\Omega'}} \mathbf{elimNot}(A,B) \cup$$
$$\bigcup_{\substack{A\in \Omega_\wedge\\ B\in\Omega'}} \mathbf{makeAnd}(A,B) \cup \bigcup_{\substack{A\in \Omega_\wedge\\ B_1\neq B_2\\ B_1,B_2\in\Omega'}} \mathbf{elimAnd}(A,B_1,B_2)$$

The executability preconditions and the effects of the actions are encoded in MBP as an implicitly conjoined set of constraints over the transition relation, again of the form $TRANS\ \Psi$.

The executability preconditions correspond to the constraints on the current

world in transition rules in Section 3:

$$\alpha = \mathbf{Read}(A, B) \rightarrow A \in K$$
$$\alpha = \mathbf{ExC}(A, B) \rightarrow U \neq V(A) = V(l(A))$$
$$\alpha = \mathbf{makeNot}(A, B) \rightarrow V(l(A)) \neq U$$
$$\alpha = \mathbf{elimNot}(A, B) \rightarrow V(A) \neq U$$
$$\alpha = \mathbf{makeAnd}(A, B) \rightarrow V(l(A)) \neq U \wedge V(r(A)) \neq U$$
$$\alpha = \mathbf{elimAnd}(A, B_1, B_2) \rightarrow V(A) \neq U$$

The (possibly nondeterministic) effects of an action are represented by partitioning the effects over the formula(s) read or built by the rule, and those over the formula(s) that are possibly overwritten by the result(s) of its application. The former are written in terms of the values V must attain for the affected formula(s) after the action execution (i.e. at the next step, denoted with X), constrained by the current values of V, according to the definitions in Section 3.

$$\alpha = \mathbf{Read}(A, B) \rightarrow X(V(A) = \top)$$
$$\alpha = \mathbf{Split}(A, B) \rightarrow X(V(A) \in \{\top, \bot\})$$
$$\alpha = \mathbf{ExC}(A, B) \rightarrow X(V(A_G) = \top)$$
$$\alpha = \mathbf{makeNot}(A, B) \rightarrow X(V(A)) = \neg(V(l(A)))$$
$$\alpha = \mathbf{elimNot}(A, B) \rightarrow X(V(l(A))) = \neg(V(A))$$
$$\alpha = \mathbf{makeAnd}(A, B) \rightarrow X(V(A)) = V(l(A)) \wedge V(r(A))$$
$$\alpha = \mathbf{elimAnd}(A, B_1, B_2) \rightarrow V(A) = X(V(l(A)) \wedge V(r(A)))$$

The following constraints ensure that overwritten formulas become undefined:

$$\alpha = \mathbf{Read}(A, B) \wedge B \notin \{A_0, A\} \rightarrow X(V(B) = U)$$
$$\alpha = \mathbf{Split}(A, B) \wedge B \notin \{A_0, A\} \rightarrow X(V(B) = U)$$
$$\alpha = \mathbf{ExC}(A, B) \wedge B \notin \{A_0, A_G\} \rightarrow X(V(B) = U)$$
$$\alpha = \mathbf{makeNot}(A, B) \wedge B \notin \{A_0, A\} \rightarrow X(V(B) = U)$$
$$\alpha = \mathbf{elimNot}(A, B) \wedge B \notin \{A_0, l(A)\} \rightarrow X(V(B) = U)$$
$$\alpha = \mathbf{makeAnd}(A, B) \wedge B \notin \{A_0, A\} \rightarrow X(V(B) = U)$$
$$\alpha = \mathbf{elimAnd}(A, B_1, B_2) \wedge B_1 \notin \{A_0, l(A), r(A)\} \rightarrow X(V(B_1) = U)$$
$$\alpha = \mathbf{elimAnd}(A, B_1, B_2) \wedge B_2 \notin \{A_0, l(A), r(A)\} \rightarrow X(V(B_2) = U)$$

The constraints above must be conjoined with those representing the **Recall** proviso, and the provisos on the inertiality of the values of non-affected formulas.

Recall is expressed by adding, for each $A \in \Omega$, two constraints of the form $V(A) = \top \rightarrow X(V(A)) \neq \bot$ and $V(A) = \bot \rightarrow X(V(A)) \neq \top$. Inertiality is expressed by adding constraints stating explicitly that unless a formula is overwritten or produced, it does not change its value, e.g.:

$$\alpha = \mathbf{makeAnd}(A, B) \wedge A' \notin \{A, B\} \rightarrow X(V(A')) = V(A')$$

Given the encoding above, the planning problem is described by an initial state where $\forall A \in \Omega : V(A) = U$, and by a goal state $V(A_G) = \top$.

MBP implements many possible search styles. We chose breadth-first backward search which guarantees that the shortest plan is selected. The computational burden imposed by such search style is effectively constrained by the use of symbolic representation techniques that allow a very compact encoding, and an efficient handling, of extremely large state sets at once; details can be found in [6].

5 Experiments

In this section we present a simple example which illustrates the effect of memory size on the minimum length of a derivation. Consider a simple agent-based tourist advice system which consists of a set of simple "business rules", some basic facts, and a business rule engine. The user can obtain the system from a tourist information office upon the payment of a fee, load the system on her PDA, configure it with additional data describing her preferences, her current situation, and so on, and use it to obtain recommendations of activities of interest. As an illustration, we shall focus on a set of rules which can help a tourist, who likes art exhibits, to select an activity:

$$\textit{askForEevent} \wedge \textit{artLover} \rightarrow \textit{considerArtEvents} \tag{3}$$

"If a user is interested in art and asks for a suggestion then consider suggesting art events".

$$\textit{askForEevent} \wedge \textit{artLover} \rightarrow sendArtInfo \tag{4}$$

"If a user is interested in art and asks for a suggestion then periodically send promotional material on art exhibitions and events in the area".

$$\begin{aligned} &\textit{raining} \wedge \textit{askForEevent} \wedge \textit{considerArtEvents} \\ &\quad \rightarrow \textit{proposeMMAtour} \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

"If a user interested art has asked for a suggestion and it is raining, then propose a visit to the Museum of Modern Art (MMA)".

$$\begin{aligned} &\textit{artLover} \wedge \textit{proposeMMAtour} \wedge \textit{userAgrees} \\ &\quad \rightarrow \textit{bookMMAtour} \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

"If a user who likes art accepts the suggestion to visit the Museum of Modern Art, then book a tour of the Museum for the user".

$$\textit{hasCar} \wedge \textit{leavesNow} \rightarrow \textit{soonAtMMA} \tag{7}$$

"If a user has a car and leaves immediately, they will soon reach the museum".

$$\begin{aligned} &\textit{proposeMMAtour} \wedge \textit{bookMMAtour} \wedge \textit{soonAtMMA} \\ &\quad \rightarrow \textit{bookNextMMAtour} \end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

"If the system has proposed a visit to the Museum of Modern Art and has an intention to book a tour there, and the user can reach the museum in a short time, then book the next tour of the Museum for the user".

In addition to the simple rules listed above, a realistic system would contain many additional rules to deal with different user preferences (e.g., Music Lovers), different selection criteria (e.g., distance to the event or cost of the event), user preferences (e.g., user prefers religious art to modern art) and so on. Given a large set of such rules, the designer of the system may want to verify, e.g., that a tourist who is interested in art and has a car, and asks for a suggestion on a rainy day, is booked on the next tour to the Museum of Modern Art, if she likes the advice of going there, and is also periodically sent promotional material on art events in the area. In other words, from the following basic facts

$$\begin{aligned} &\textit{askForEevent}, \textit{artLover}, \textit{raining}, \\ &\textit{userAgrees}, \textit{hasCar}, \textit{leavesNow} \end{aligned}$$

an agent running on a PDA with a memory of size n can infer

$$bookNextMMAtour \wedge sendArtInfo.$$

In addition, the designer may be interested in how increases in memory size affect the number steps required for the derivation, e.g., if they wish to trade memory for response time.

Figure 2 shows the length of the shortest deduction of the formula

$$bookNextMMAtour \wedge sendArtInfo$$

for different memory sizes as determined by the MBP planner. As can be seen, deriving the target formula requires a memory of at least size 3, and with this amount of memory the deduction requires 31 steps. With a memory of size 4, the number of steps in the deduction drops to 27. Further increases in the amount of memory do not result in further reductions in the length of derivation. This is



Figure 2: Running the example

because the fourth cell is used to store an intermediate result which is used more than once in the derivation and does not need to be recomputed, thus shortening the inference process. With only four memory locations, a derivation of length 27 results in a memory location being over-written 23 times. To illustrate this, we added an extra step to deductions which over-write a memory location (we can think of this step as choosing which location in memory to over-write). The upper curve in Figure 2 shows the length of the derivations including these extra steps. With a memory of size 3, the number of steps in the derivation (including over-writes) is 59. With a memory of size 4 this drops to 50 steps (i.e., 27 steps + 23 over-write operations). As can be seen, the number of times a cell in over-written continues to drop with increasing memory size, until with a memory of size 27, when we can store all the subformulas used in the derivation in memory, the length of the derivation is the same as in the previous case.

6 Related work

Our work is related to other work on logics of knowledge and belief, for example [10], and recent work on dynamic epistemic logic [21] which describes *evolution* of knowledge. However, most epistemic logics assume that the agent's knowledge is deductively closed, and therefore do not try to model the time and space restrictions on the agent's ability to derive consequences of its beliefs. There is a growing body of work where the agent's deduction steps are explicitly modelled in the logic, for example [9, 7, 2, 1], which makes it possible to model the time it takes the agent to arrive at a certain conclusion, but not space. Limitations on memory are considered in work on logic of games, for example [20], where an agent with limited memory can base its strategy only on a limited portion of the game's history. A different kind of limitation on the depth of belief reasoning allowed is studied in [12].

Both the time and space limitations on the agent's knowledge were considered in *step logics* [9]. Step logic makes use of the notion of a *step* in reasoning. Given a set of formulas X and a set of inference rules I, one performs a step of reasoning by adding the consequents of any applicable inference rule in I to X. If a formula ϕ had been derived in this way at step t, it is said to be a t-theorem. One can model an agent which knows the rule of conjunction introduction using the following step logic rule. If ϕ and ψ are both t theorems for some step t, then $\phi \wedge \psi$ is a $t+1$ theorem. The set of t-theorems is not closed under logical consequence, for any (finite) step t. The set of theorems gets larger and larger at each step, making the model of the reasoner unrealistic.

[8] and [18] attempt to address the issue of increasing memory demands in step logic. They distinguish long-term from short term memory (LTM and STM, respectively). While LTM is unbounded, STM is of a fixed size n. They also introduce a third kind of memory, QTM, to serve as an intermediary. In a step, the agent's inference rules are applied only to formulas in STM, the consequences being added to QTM. The step concludes by selecting at most n formulas from QTM to be moved to STM. Formulas may also be moved from LTM to STM, provided the total number of STM formulas does not exceed n. One of the differences between the step logic approach and our approach is in considering several different kinds of memory, and in the motivation. Rather than being interested in verification of space requirements for solving a certain problem, [8] are concerned with restricting the size of short term memory to isolate any possible contradictions, therefore avoiding the problem of *swamping*: deriving all possible consequences from a contradiction.

The problem of formal verification of multi agent systems has lead to a growing stream of work, especially in the area of multi agent model checking [3, 16]. The existing work, however, is mainly focused on logically omniscient agents, that is, agents who instantaneously believe all the logical consequences of their basic beliefs, and no time and space limitations are taken into account.

The connection between deduction and planning has long been established for a variety of logics, e.g. temporal, linear and propositional logics, see [15, 5, 17, 11]. The existing work, however, focused on using effective theorem provers to build plans, rather than exploiting a planner to build a deduction. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first experiment in this direction.

7 Conclusions and Future Work

In this paper, we have attempted to take seriously the idea that reasoning is a process which requires memory and time. While the temporal aspect of reasoning has

been studied before, we believe that our treatment of the memory aspect is novel. We have proposed a new kind of epistemic logic where both resources are explicitly modelled. The logic is interpreted on state transition systems, where the agent's state can contain only a fixed finite number of formulas (beliefs), and transitions correspond to application of inference rules by the agent. By specifying the state transition system as an input to the MBP planner, we can automatically verify the lower bounds on space and time required by the agent to derive a certain formula. Our approach can be used to model reasoners with different sets of inference rules, and we have shown how to model a rule-based agent which essentially uses only the inference rules of modus ponens and conjunction introduction, and a reasoner in full classical logic.

We are aware of a number of limitations of the work presented here. In particular, our model of memory requires further refinement to more accurately reflect the memory usage of an agent. For example, at present the agent does not pay a memory penalty for maintaining a set of epistemic alternatives; in future work we plan to introduce a memory cost for each epistemic alternative. Another design choice we made is to require that a rule-based agent loads a rule in memory before it can use it; it can be argued that a rule-based agent's working memory only contains facts, and the rule usage should not incur a memory cost. However, we believe that our general framework is sound and flexible, and can be adapted to verify space and time requirements for a wide range of reasoning agents.

In future work, we plan to model multi-agent systems, including agents which are capable of reasoning about other agents' beliefs, including reasoning in epistemic logic. We also would like to model reasoners in description logics, since verifying agents which do ontological reasoning is one of our prime motivations.

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